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Politics and the Federal Appointments Process 
by HLPRolllille editorial staff all Apl'il5, 2011 
By Brian C. Kalt 
Eighteen months into President Obama's term, twenty-five percent of "key policymakiog positions" had not yet 
been filled. 
The Constitution directs the President and the Senate to work together to hire federal judges and top 
executive officials. Unfortunately, the "PAS" process (presidential appointment and Senate 
confirmation) falls well short of this constitutional ideal. This essay will identify some problems with 
the process , and then discuss the important role of politics in it. This will lead to a counterintuitive 
conclusion: the main problem with the current appointments climate is that the President and the 
Senate are not being confrontational and combative enough. 
I. Three Problems with the Process 
A. Too Large and Too Slow 
There are cUlTently over 1,100 PAS offices in the federal executive branch, each of which must be filled 
anew by an incoming President.W It is hard to do promptly. Eighteen months into President Obama's 
tenu, twenty-five percent of "key policymaking positions" had not yet been filled.[gl The process is like 
trying to fill a sieve ; before the last cadre of executive officers is picked and confinued, earlier ones have 
already stmtedleaving.I3J One study measured the avel'age vacancy rate between 1977 and 2001 at 
twenty-five percent, and as high as fifty percent near the end of some acliuinistrations as officers left to 
beat the lUsh for private-sector jobs.JAl 
Fillingjudicial vacancies is a Sisyphean task as well. President Obama began his tenu with fifty-five 
judicial vacancies; by the end of 2010, there were ninety-six. In that time, he managed to appoint 62 
judges, but 103 new vacancies arose (about half awaited a nominee; the others ' nominations were 
pending in tile Senate).f5l 
The burden could be smaller; Congress has given too many "inferior" offices PAS status , even though 
the Constitution does not require Senate confirmation or even presidential appointment for them.[Ql 
The process could also be sped up. Presidents take too long to select nominees.[zl The Senate 
confirmation process adds time, even WitilOut the obstructions discussed in the nex1: section. Perhaps 
the biggest impediment is background checks. Nominees are scrutinized by several separate actors , 
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which entails filling out redundant, intrusive, and often pointless paperwork. As one critic described the 
system in 2008, "[nlominees must wait for months as the White House, FBI, IRS, Office of 
Govemment Ethics, and Senate inspect the 60 pages of forms that must be filled out on the way to 
confirmation, including one that still has to be completed by ty1)ewriter."ill 
B. The Super-Majoritarian Difficulty 
The PAS process is inefficient enough when everyone tries to move things forward-but not evelyone 
does. The power of the presidency has increased tremendously in the last eighty years, largely at 
Congress's e:>q)ense. Senators have used their stranglehold on PAS appointments as a way to claw back 
some of that power.[gl 
Technically speaking, confirming a PAS nomination requires a majority in the Senate. Practically 
speaking, however, six-ty senators are needed to fend off a filibuster. The Senate "blue slip" process 
empowers individual senators to hinder nominations for judgeships in their own states. Most super-
majoritarian of all is the indefinite "hold," with which any senator can freeze any nomination. 
Because nominations require only a majority vote, these super-majority tactics work by preventing that 
vote from taking place. But delay is a tool of majorities too; rather than vote a nominee down and defeat 
the President directly, Senate leaders can keep a nomination bottled up in committee, 01' even after 
committee action, leave the President and his nominee in limbo. In late J'vlarch 2010, for instance, 
President Obama noted that of his 217 nominees pending before the Senate, 77 were pending "on the 
floor," having made it through committee; 44 of those had been waiting more than a month.Lilll 
Some commentators defend these delaying maneuvers, arguing that they strengthen the Senate's 
checking function, and force the President to make more moderate choices.Lul Theil' argument would 
be more persuasive if the obstructers only used their power to oppose nominees on the merits. J'vlost 
often, though, the obstructers are just ex1:racting concessions on other, unrelated Senate business.I1.;U 
The problem persists because senators guard these prerogatives jealously. They may complain about 
filibusters and holds when they are in the majority, but they are skittish about actually ever changing 
things. Indeed, they quickly swap talking points with the other side whenever control of the Senate 
changes hands.fl3l This year, sUlvrisingly, the Senate actually eliminated a couple of its more 
objectionable delaying mechanisms, such as secret holds, but it left all of the others in place.ll4l 
C. Speeding Down Oak Street 
The President has ways to bypass the Senate, and he has an incentive to use them when the PAS process 
breaks down. But like a drivel' who avoids traffic on the main road by speeding down residential side 
streets, Presidents who take this route trade one set of problems for another. 
1. Recess Appointments 
One "residential side street" is the recess appointment. If the Senate does not act on a nomination, the 
Constitution empowers the President to fill the office unilaterally Cif temporarily) the nex1: time the 
Senate recesses.L!5l The Recess Appointment Clause was designed for an earlier era, when the Senate 
was in recess evelY year for several months at a time. If a vacancy arose during those long recesses, the 
President needed a way to fill it. Nowadays, the Senate takes frequent, but short, recesses.I1.Ql It takes 
so long to fill vacancies when the Senate is in session that these brief recesses do not present urgent 
needs for ex1:raordinary appointments. Neveltheless, the language of the Recess Appointments Clause is 
broad enough to accommodate modem Presidents' more aggressive use of it. 
2. Acting Ofiicers 
A second bypass is the appointment of acting officers. Federal law allows acting officers to occupy 
vacant posts during the wait for a pelmanent officer. The President can leave the old officer's deputy in 
charge, pick another official from the same agency, 01' designate another PAS official from 
elsewhere.L!zl The law imposes time limits on acting officers' tenures, but these limits are often 
ignored and are not applicable anyway if the Senate is dragging its feet in confirming a replacement.L.!lU 
3. Reallocating Power 
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A final technique is reallocating power. If a President wants to enfeeble a particular office, he can just 
put a low priority on filling it when it becomes vacant and there is little the Senate can do about it.L!9l 
Given that Congress creates PAS positions to execute particular functions under federal law, this 
arguably violates the President's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed."f..gQ} 
Presidents can also siphon power away from PAS offices and concentrate it in the White House instead. 
PAS officers exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."L£!l The White 
House staff is powerful but typically does not have this sort of direct legal authority; rathel', it advises 
the President in the exercise of his authority. Therefore, the President can hire most of his staff without 
following any constitutional process.[g;U 
Counting employees "detailed" to the vVhite House from executive agencies, there are several hundred 
"policy" staff in the White House.LGl The recent increase in policy "czars" has attracted notice too, not 
least because most are not PAS officials, and many in fact supplant PAS officials.8M} If the President 
reallocates power in these ways, he effectively neuters the PAS officer who is supposed to deal with an 
issue, subordinating him 01' her to the non-PAS staff member. This gives the President less reason to be 
prompt, careful, 01' aggressive when nominating those PAS officers. 
4. Sacriticing Ideals 
These bypasses are suboptimal even from the President's point of view: recess and acting appointments 
are temporary; vacant offices are vacant; and special advisors lack powers, like issuing regulations, that 
they would have as PAS officers.L65} But even with these limitations, the President can distribute 
massive power without going through the PAS process. The Senate may deserve to be circumvented, but 
as argued flUther below, the overuse of these bypasses contributes to the President's dysfunctional 
relationship with the Senate. 
II. Politics 
Notwithstanding the problems discussed above, most PAS positions am filled by the PAS process. The 
key, both when the system works and when it breaks down, is politics. This section will ruminate on 
this point. 
A. Politics When It Works 
Politics are the lifeblood of the PAS system. After all, the President and senators are politicians. It is 
unsm}}rising-indeed, it is intended-that a process defined by their participation would be infused with 
politics, rather thanjust with neutral principles of human-resources management. 
The trick, as Christophel' Eisgruber has eloquently e};plained, is to make tlle process political in the best 
sense of the tenn ratller than the worst.[g§l "Political" does not have to mean "demagogic," "venal," 
"mean-spirited," 01' "focusing on paltisan point-scoring rather than tlle public interest." True, some of 
these tllings are inevitable features of our political culture. But when politicians actually accomplish 
things, it is by working with each other and hammering out compromises to please tlleir respective 
constituencies. At its best, then, a "political" process is one that ensures deliberation, accountability, and 
consensus.[gzl As Eisgruber makes clear, politics are not a defect of the PAS system, they are its 
principal feature, and we should embrace this fact.~ 
For the PAS system to function meaningfully, it requires conflict.8ill} If the Senate were simply to 
rubber-stamp all of the President's nominees, it would resolve the vacancy problem, but it would 
deprive tlle nation of a check on the President. When the Senate really scrutinizes tlle President's picks, 
by contrast, it can hold him accountable. 
The political character of the PAS process can soften its excesses. For instance, in 2010, when Senator 
Richard Shelby placed holds on seventy nominations because of a dispute over federal projects in his 
state, he quicklv relented. The strong response from other senators and President Obama made it 
politically untenable for him to delay appointments over unrelated demands.I3..Ql Similarly, high-stakes 
nominations (e.g., Supreme Comt, cabinet secretaries) do not see the same level of obstruction (e.g., 
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filibusters, holds) as their less important counterparts. If filling a vacancy is important enough, the 
President and the Senate will fill it;I31l conversely, when the political costs of obstruction are low 
enough relative to the political benefits of action, eX1)ect obstruction. 
These equations are complicated by the wide range of issues the Senate hanclles. Appointments are just 
one more ingredient in the Senate's complicated tangle of compromises, logrolling, and other deal 
making. Arguably, appointments should be different, because staffing the govel1lment is mandator), in a 
way that passing new legislation is not. But the special importance of appointments does not wall them 
off from the rest of the Senate's business. Indeed, appointments provide a tempting opportunity for 
senators to kick a President when they think he is down.I3..£[ At any rate, calculating the political costs 
and benefits of obstructing an appointment might require considering its effect on, say, education 
spending 01' foreign policY.I33l 
Another complication is that senators put a high value on maintaining their ability to obstruct. Senators 
may seem myopic, obstructing nominations even though their opponents will be inspired to perpetrate 
paybacks when party control shifts. But pro-President senators am thinking about a future in which 
they are in a different position. By preserving the ability of their opponents to single-handeclly obstruct 
the President's nominations now, they are preserving their OW1l ability to do the same at some later 
date.I3..4l 
When the costs of obstruction are too low, "good" politics, with its deliberation and its accountability, 
breaks down. Perhaps the most stunning example of too-low cost was the recently eliminated "secret 
holds"; senators using them could prevent an office from being filled at viltually no cost to themselves. 
Theil' secrecy also meant that such holds conveyed no useful information to the countl)' about the 
office, the nominee, 01' the objector. Secret holds did not advance the pllIposes of the PAS process in any 
waY·L35l 
Another maneuver that is too "quiet," and which is still used, is the passive filibuster. Senators do not 
need to actually filibuster a nomination (i.e., talk it to death on the Senate floor) to defeat it. Current 
Senate procedures allow them to achieve the same effect merely by threatening a filibuster, so 
nominations get stalled 01' defeated by these low-profile, low-cost feints. 
vVhen the political costs of obstruction are high, by contrast, compromises are struck and obstructions 
are resolved.I3..§l If Presidents and senators fight back hard enough against obstruction, it shrinks away. 
There are countless examples, but a single well-trodden one must suffice. Senate Democrats filibustered 
several of President George W. Bush's appellate judicial nominees. There was mainly silence from both 
sides, punctuated by occasional bluster), rhetoric about how unacceptably ex1:reme the nominees were, 
how the Senate was acting unconstitutionally, and so on. At a certain point, the number of vacancies 
grew too large for either side to countenance (my own circuit, the Six1:h, was half vacant). In 2005, the 
so-called "Gang of 14" moderate senators from both patties agreed to end the filibusters and prevent the 
filibuster-killing "nuclear option" from being invoked. Under the deal, two of the nominations were 
killed. Seven others got a Senate vote, which were all successful (the three from the Six1:h Circuit were 
unanimous; a fOllIth nominee won with more than sixi:)' votes). The logjam was broken.I31J. 
People frequently complain about Senate obstructions, but talk is cheap. The President, his Senate 
partisans, and his Senate opponents all have ample power and influence. vVhen they use it, they can 
cajole and publicly harangue each other until the political costs of obstruction are high enough to make 
a breakthrough deal worthwhile.f3!U If the players are not inclined to use their power, then that is their 
choice. At that point, though, their complaints become much less compelling. 
B. Politics When It Fails 
President Obama has used the methods discussed in Part I.C to bn)ass the Senate, including making 
dozens of recess appointments and, most prominently, designating Elizabeth vVatTen as a "special 
advisor" rather than nominating her to head the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.I3gl 
The importance of "good" politics sheds new light on such actions. At first glance, these bypasses seem 
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useful: if the Senate mistreats a nominee and prolongs a vacancy, the President reasonably uses his 
power to work around the Senate and do the people's business. Looking deeper, though, these 
maneuvers represent political failures. They bypass not only the Senate but the entire political process, 
with all of its benefits. If the President and the Senate disagree, they should argue, struggle, and work it 
out. Avoiding conflict means avoiding that beneficial engagement. 
A system is properly political not when there are no conflicts, but rather when conflicts produce results. 
If Presidents and senators work too slowly on appointments, but neither says much about it, there is 
little chance that either side will improve its efficiency. When senators block a nominee fairly 
noiselessly, without a vote, and then Presidents are quick to act unilaterally and bypass the system with 
an acting 01' recess appointment, there is no engagement-no deliberation, no accountability, and no 
development of a consensus. 
Consider, by contrast, a system in which: 
1) opposition senators speak out against a nominee (01' the lack of one) prominently, forcefully, and 
persistently; 
2) tlle President and his Senate suppOlters speak out in favor of a nominee (01' against tlle opposition's 
foot-dragging) prominently, forcefully, and persistently; 
3) tlle opponents use parliamentary maneuvers to tly to defeat nominations, but in public and "noisy" 
vvays; 
4) tlle proponents respond in similarly public and noisy ways; and 
5) tllere are clear results, either from a vote 01', in the shadow of a vote, from a compromise. 
In such a system, evelyone knows what is happening, and who is doing what. There are clear results. 
vVhen each side conducts itself in a noisy way-a way that conveys information to the other side and to 
the public-the cost of poi1ltless obstruction becomes too high to sustain. 
This is an ideal, of course, and tlle reality of the PAS process has never been, and will never be, this 
robust. Politicians have only a limited amount of time, energy, and political capital, and it makes little 
sense to think that they eX1)end all of it on appointments.JAQl Still, tlle closer to this ideal, the better the 
PAS system will work.L4!l To the ex1:ent tllat the system falls ShOlt, it is as a result of political choices, 
and it benefits the system to make tllOse political choices more visible to the voting public. 
In other areas, politics need not be this loud for things to get done. But here, the altemative of waiting 
for everyone to do a better job out of the goochless of their hemts simply has not worked. There are too 
many back doors, too many impedect but easy ways out. A good appointments process requires noise. 
C. Getting Specific 
There are specific ways in which louder politics could lead to better results. Louchless itself is not 
enough, and it can be destructive; the players must be yelling the right things. 
1. Balance 
As a general matter, usefulrefonns that take power away from the Senate (like clearing away senators' 
powers to obstruct, 01' removing the requirement of Senate confirmation for hunch'ecls of positions) will 
be unpopular with senators unless there is an obvious and significant payoff.JAgl Similarly, the 
President will not favor useful things that reduce his power (like delegating to cabinet secretaries the 
power to appoint their own underlings, 01' reducing the size and power of the White House staff vis-a-vis 
PAS officers) unless he gets some benefits in return. Any comprehensive solution must be carefully 
balanced, so that nobody is gaining 01' giving up too much power.1A3l 
2. Vacancies 
Sometimes a post stays vacant, with the President not even bothering to bn)ass the Senate. This is bad 
for one of two reasons. If the post is impOltant for the President to fill, it is bad to leave it unfilled. If the 
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post is not important, it is bad to leave it standing, as opposed to legislatively demoting it to non-PAS 
status, 01' abolishing it altogether. 
Fixing these sorts of vacancies thus requires that the President and Congress first hammer out to which 
category a palticular vacancy belongs.lA4l If the two sides do not agree on whether an office needs to be 
filled, noisy rhetoric about sluggish nominations and sluggish confirmations will miss the point. 
3. Acting and Recess Appointments 
At the time he makes a nomination, the President could communicate to the Senate whether and how 
he will use his acting 01' recess appointment powers if the Senate does not move quickly enough. Then, 
if the Senate ch'ags its feet, it will know that it is acquiescing to the acting 01' recess appointment. 
The President should not follow through on such a threat unless the Senate is proceeding in bad faith. If 
the Senate is on its way to rejecting a nomination, 01' is at least truly deliberating, it will not have given 
the same implicit approval of a bypass. Thus, the President must communicate not just which 
nominations could yield acting 01' recess appointments, but also what benchmarks and timetables he 
will use to judge the Senate's good faith. Providing that sort of infonnation would make things fairer, 
because the President would use his powers only after giving senators a reasonable chance to use theirs. 
It would also convey valuable information (who, what, when, and why) to both the political players and 
the public. 
Some might call this whole strategy politically unrealistic. The President can potentially turn allY stalled 
nomination into an acting 01' recess appointment, and he might not want to limit that implicit threat up 
front. He also might not want to sacrifice his power to unilaterally appoint people disapproved by the 
Senate. For its palt, the Senate would likely resent having benchmarks and timetables dictated to it.lA5l 
But consider the status quo. The President's "implicit threat" has not made the Senate move quickly 
enough 01' fairly enough. Recent Presidents have shown restraint in not unilaterally appointing truly 
unpopular nominees. And while the Senate might resent being dictated to, key leaders could work with 
the President to draw up standards and timelines. The Senate might prefer this to being bn)assed 
altogether. 
4. White House Consolidation 
Senators might not like the tremendous growth[46] in the White House staff, and they might find ways 
to strike back,1Azl but they (along with the House) have enabled the situation. The President can 
realTange, subdivide, and assign his stafflargely as he sees fit, but he cannot grow it significantly by 
himself. Congress must agree to pay for it, and it obviously has done so. This might reflect Presidents' 
strong bargaining position in budgetary matters, 01' it might indicate congressional sympathy for 
Presidents' desire to consolidate their power over the sprawling federal bureaucracy and policymaking 
apparatus. vVhatever the source, though, Congress acted affirmatively to make this happen. 
At this point, any attempt to scale back the size and power of the White House staff would require either 
that: (1) Congress give significant concessions to the President in exchange for his agreement; 01' (2) the 
President be much weaker politically than any President in recent memory. As to point (1), Presidents 
typically have plenty of policy initiatives on which they might accept concessions from the Senate, but it 
is easier to imagine tllings staying in the appointments contex1:. For instance, in exchange for the 
President shifting power back to PAS offices, the Senate could make concessions on how it hanclles 
nOlllinations. 
D. Quasi-Political Solutions 
Fixing our first set of problems-in efficiency-mostly requires better leadership and management, but it 
still implicates politics at some level. For instance, to pick PAS nominees faster, Presidents should do 
moresearching and vetting before they are even elected.f4lU CUlTently, there are incentives 1l0t to do 
this: it seems presumptuous; potential picks might become campaign issues; it would divert resources 
from the immediate task of getting elected. But being able to hit the ground running once elected is 
surely a compelling goal too. Candidates should be able to conduct their operations quietly enough, and 
to mutually disarm rather tllan investigate and attack each others' proto-nominees.lA9l J'vlore 
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importantly, Congress should be able to muster a consensus to legislate resources for these conditional-
transition efforts .I5Ql This would be politically neutral between candidates and between the President 
and the Senate. J'vloreover, nobody would sacrifice power, and everybody would benefit from the 
efficiency gains. 
Similarly, reforming the background-check process would mainly require gumption,I5...!l and it would 
not alter the balance of power between the President and the Senate. If Congress is truly interested in 
reforming the PAS process, it could fund an enhanced personnel operation within the vVhite House, 
which could work with the Senate to streamline the information-gathering process.~ 
Given that all sides would benefit from improved efficiency, it is somewhat smprising that more has not 
been done. Perhaps the reason is politics again; the fact that these reforms would be politically neutral 
means, conversely, that nobody sees much political gain in pursuing them. But here too , the solution is 
political confrontation. Some President 01' senator should be able to score political points by drawing 
attention to the truly ridiculous inefficiency of the ClllTent process, the fecklessness of its current 
participants, and the potential for creating effective solutions. 
III. Conclusion: Reforms in Perspective 
Commentators on reforming the PAS process often repeat the same suggestion: better dialogue between 
Presidents and senators. But here, "better dialogue" does not mean Presidents and senators being more 
accommodating to each other.I53l To really improve the PAS process, better dialogue must be more 
aggressive. As long as it is not - as long as the players quietly subve1t the system, avoiding solutions 
rather than forcing them-the PAS process will continue to be dysfunctional. 
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